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Abstract
The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-09 triggered a deep recession in Greece, leading investors
to withdraw one third of Greek bank deposits between 2008 and 2011. As banks’
nonperforming assets rose and rating agencies downgraded Greek sovereign debt, Greek
banks’ capital fell below levels required for Eurosystem refinancing operations. In response,
the Bank of Greece (BOG) provided Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) to all Greek banks.
ELA was a revolving credit line open to solvent institutions at a premium rate, so long as that
support did not interfere with the Eurosystem’s monetary policy. European Central Bank
(ECB) rules required the BOG to bear all credit risk for ELA. The Greek case was the first ELA
to be administered to an entire financial system. From August 2011 to February 2019, the
BOG provided ELA at a 100-150 basis-point premium over the ECB’s refinancing rate. ELA
outstanding peaked at EUR 124 billion (USD 162 billion) in May 2012, and again at EUR 90
billion in May 2015. In total, banks paid EUR 4.5 billion in premia above Eurosystem interest
rates. ELA ended when Greek banks were once again accepted as counterparties in
Eurosystem refinancing operations. A small body of research agrees that ELA significantly
improved the liquidity of Greek banks.
Keywords: ELA, Emergency Liquidity Assistance, Eurozone Crisis, Global Financial Crisis,
Greece, lender of last resort, Sovereign Debt Crisis

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering broad-based emergency lending programs. Cases are available from the Journal of
Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
2 Research Associate, YPFS, Yale School of Management. The author thanks Spiros Pantelias for his exceptional
commitment to ensuring this case was as comprehensive as possible.
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Overview
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) revealed
deep vulnerabilities in Greece’s economy and
finances. Still, bank deposits continued to rise
through September 2009, and domestic
banks received Eurosystem refinancing at
rates consistent with pre-crisis years
(Andruszkiewicz et al. 2020; Runkel 2021). In
October 2009, the government announced
that its budget deficit would be 12.5% of GDP,
not 3.7%, as previously expected. This
surprise led rating agencies to announce the
first of seven downgrades to the country’s
sovereign debt, causing it to fall below the
credit ratings required by the European
Central Bank (ECB) for its main and longerterm refinancing operations (MROs and
LTROs) (Andruszkiewicz et al. 2020).

Key Terms

Greek banks experienced distress following
these downgrades owing to the banks’
uncommonly high holdings of Greek
sovereign debt (Andruszkiewicz et al. 2020).3
After the downgrades in later 2009 and early
2010, neither the Eurosystem nor private
counterparties accepted Greek sovereign
debt as collateral (Pantelias 2021b). In May
2010, the ECB waived its credit-quality
requirements for Greek sovereign debt after
Greece signed onto an Economic Adjustment
Program (EAP) administered by the ECB,
European Commission, and International
Monetary Fund, collectively, the Troika
(ECB/2010/3 2010). This waiver permitted
the Greek banks to use Greek sovereign debt
as collateral to access the main and longerterm refinancing operations (MROs and
LTROs) administered by the ECB. Greek
banks dominated usage of these facilities

Purpose: to “counterbalanc[e] the decrease in and
the withdrawal of deposits by the private and public
sectors, as well as the decrease in the value of
eligible collateral for monetary policy operations”
(Bank of Greece 2014, 160)
Launch Dates

First activation: August
2011
Second activation:
February 2015

Expiration Dates

First activation: May
2014
Second activation:
March 2019

Legal Authority

Statute of the ESCB,
article 14.4

Peak Outstanding

First activation: EUR
124 billion in May 2012
Second activation: EUR
87 billion in June 2015

Participants

Solvent Greek banks

Rate

Fixed rate 100-150 bps
above ECB main
refinancing rate

Collateral

Unknown; included
Greek sovereign debt

Loan Duration

Case-by-case basis;
short-term

Notable Features

National central bank
bore risk; first broadbased ELA

Outcomes

Support repaid in March
2019

Each country in the eurozone issued its own euro-denominated debt, and ECB regulatory and refinancing
requirements did not discriminate between debt issued by a bank’s home country or that of another eurozone
Member State. Banks, therefore, received little incentive from the Eurosystem to purchase home country debt
above that of another eurozone Member State. Andruskiewicz (2020) proposes, however, that the Greek
3
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from September 2010 to August 2011, borrowing more than one fifth of the total lent by the
Eurosystem in each month (Runkel 2021; ECB 2021).
Further complicating the situation faced by Greek banks during this period, they began to
experience a “large and persistent increase in” nonperforming loans (NPLs)
(Andruszkiewicz et al. 2020). From 2008 to 2012, NPLs increased from less than 6% to more
than 30%. The recession—GDP declined 17% from 2008 to 2012—was made worse by bank
management, foreclosure moratoria, and an inefficient legal regime for resolving NPLs
(Andruszkiewicz et al. 2020; Bank of Greece 2014, 101). Experts agreed that these two
factors—the home bias of banks toward Greek government bonds and the potential
difficulties in recovering collateral—were the most important causes of Greece’s banking
crisis. In addition, banks had no capital buffers to absorb losses (Andruszkiewicz et al. 2020).
In summer 2011, low capital adequacy ratios began to disqualify many Greek banks from
Eurosystem lending facilities (Andruszkiewicz et al. 2020). The same problems excluded
banks from nonofficial funding sources (Pantelias 2021b, 51:20-51:50). Facing liquidity
crises and declining capital, in August 2011 the first banks applied to the Bank of Greece
(BOG) for Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA), a facility governed by Eurosystem rules
that had been used in other eurozone countries to rescue individual banks (Mourmouras
2017).
Eurosystem rules required the national central bank administering an ELA program to bear
all risks. This contrasted with other forms of Eurosystem liquidity, in which risk was shared
between the ECB and the national central bank. ELA allowed national central banks, such as
the BOG, to act as lender of last resort—that is, to offer a line of credit to solvent but illiquid
institutions headquartered in their jurisdictions at a premium above Eurosystem refinancing
operations—so long as such lending did not conflict with the Eurosystem’s monetary policy
(ECB 2013).
Under Eurosystem rules that were developed during Greece’s crisis but applied across the
Eurosystem, ELA was priced between 100 and 150 basis points above Eurosystem
refinancing facilities (Suoninen and Jones 2013; Mourmouras 2017; Andruszkiewicz et al.
2020). In addition to collateral eligible for other forms of Eurosystem refinancing, Greek
government bonds were eligible regardless of credit rating (Mourmouras 2017). Banks
accessed ELA by applying to the BOG, which would then review applications and submit an
ELA request to the ECB (Pantelias 2021c, 26:36-27:00). The ECB Governing Council
approved EUR 50 billion (USD 66 billion4) initially for the Greek ELA. This ceiling was
regularly reviewed by the BOG (to ensure support was appropriate) and the ECB Governing
Council (to ensure ELA did not conflict with Eurosystem monetary policy) (Pantelias 2021b;
Andruszkiewicz et al. 2020).

government pressured banks to buy domestic bonds, resulting in a higher ownership than in other countries
and creating a dynamic where bank solvency was tightly interwoven with that of the Greek government.
4 EUR 0.76 = USD 1 in 2010.
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Monthly ELA draws grew from EUR 20 billion to EUR 50 billion between August and October
2011 as Greece’s crisis worsened. Usage spiked to more than EUR 100 billion in February
2012 after the ECB revoked its first waiver covering Greek debt in response to the
government’s creation of a bond-exchange scheme that devalued its debt (Runkel 2021;
ECB/2012/2 2012). As shown in Figure 1, ELA peaked in May 2012, when banks borrowed
more than EUR 120 billion—roughly equivalent to 64% of the country’s GDP. The ECB
quickly instated a second waiver after Greece started a bond-purchase program to guard the
value of its debt. But after this program ended, the ECB revoked the second waiver and ELA
usage again spiked, above EUR 120 billion (Runkel 2021; Gibson et al. 2020; ECB/2012/2
2012; Bank of Greece 2014, 101). When the condition of Greek banks began improving, in
December 2012, the ECB issued a third waiver allowing Greek debt to be used as collateral
against the MROs and LTROs, further helping the condition of Greek banks (ECB/2012/32
2012). Throughout 2013 and into 2014, banks requested less and less ELA, ultimately
phasing it out in May 2014 (Mourmouras 2017).
However, the January 2015 election of an anti-austerity government fueled fears over
Greece’s economy and its place in the eurozone (Andruszkiewicz et al. 2020; Mourmouras
2017). In February, the ECB revoked the third waiver, causing banks to apply again for ELA
and starting the second activation of the tool in Greece’s crisis (Mourmouras 2017;
ECB/2015/6 2015). Usage reached EUR 66 billion in February and peaked at EUR 87 billion
in June amid deposit runs (Runkel 2021). That month, the ECB Governing Council refused to
raise the ELA ceiling to cover further requests from banks (Pantelias 2021c, 23:33-23:45;
Wyplosz 2015). With the imposition of capital controls and the passage of time, usage of ELA
tapered, finally ending in March 2019. However, as of 2021, deposits had not returned to
their September 2009 peak.
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Figure 1: Outstanding Liquidity from the Bank of Greece to Greek Banks

Source: Runkel 2021.

Summary Evaluation
Greece’s crisis marked the first time ELA had been used on an entire Member State’s banking
system, and it exposed the BOG and the Eurosystem to unusually large risks. Market
commentators speculated that Greece would be kicked out of the eurozone as yields on its
sovereign debt soared (Wyplosz 2015; see Figure 3). To resolve the crisis, Greece imposed
capital controls and a bank holiday at the end of June 2015. This second wave of ELA tapered
much more slowly than the first and did not end until early 2019 (Andruszkiewicz et al.
2020).
A small body of literature on the Greek ELA agrees that it was effective at relieving interbank
funding pressures. Andruskiewicz et al. (2020) surveyed 30 experts close to the BOG.
Respondents rated ELA the most effective of various measures employed in addressing the
liquidity needs of the Greek banking sector: the capital controls, ECB rate cuts, and
Eurosystem open market operations. About 70% said ELA was highly effective “in
addressing the liquidity needs of the Greek banks” (Andruszkiewicz et al. 2020). Kostika and
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Laopodis (2020) found that ELA alleviated interbank funding strains in several of the
countries in which it was implemented. They concluded that Greek ELA also likely helped
increase deposits and narrow spreads of Greek bonds over German sovereign debt; however,
they also concluded that the effects of ELA are difficult to separate from other Greek
programs. Research by BOG staff also credited ELA lending with positive effects on bank
lending, GDP growth, and with positive spillover effects on the health of other Greek banks
(Gibson et al. 2020).

849

Greece

Runkel

Context: Greece 2010–2011

GDP
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)

$298.5 billion in 2010
$284.2 billion in 2011
$26,717 in 2010
$25,484 in 2011

Sovereign credit rating
(five-year senior debt)
Size of banking system
Size of banking system
as a percentage of GDP
Size of banking system
as a percentage of financial system
Five-bank concentration of banking system
Foreign involvement in banking system
Government ownership of banking system

Existence of deposit insurance

Moody’s: Ba1 in 2010; Ca in 2011
S&P: BB+ in 2010; CC in 2011
Fitch: BBB- in 2010; CCC in 2011
$373.66 billion in 2010
$422.62 billion in 2011
125% of 2010 GDP
149% of 2011 GDP
Data not available in 2010
Data not available in 2011
80.7% of assets in 2010
93.5% of assets in 2011
13.0% of assets in 2010
9.0% of assets in 2011
Data not available in 2010
Data not available in 2011
$133,333 provided by Hellenic
Deposit and Investment Guarantee
Fund in 2010
$133,333 provided by Hellenic
Deposit and Investment Guarantee
Fund in 2011

Sources: Bloomberg; Federal Reserve Economic Data; World Bank Global Financial
Development Database.
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: The BOG used ELA to provide funds to Greek banks after they lost access
to Eurosystem liquidity facilities.
Greece experienced a deep recession after the GFC. In 2008, banks’ nonperforming assets
rose, and in 2009, deposit outflows began (see Figure 8; Andruszkiewicz et al. 2020). Greek
banks also held a large amount of Greek government bonds, which saw successive creditrating downgrades and a significant depreciation in 2010 and 2011 (see Figure 2). Banks
turned to Eurosystem liquidity facilities for financing (see Figure 6) and private
counterparties as well but decreases in bank capital disqualified banks from borrowing
(Andruszkiewicz et al. 2020). The Bank of Greece (BOG) provided ELA for all Greek banks to
fill that funding gap (Bank of Greece 2014, 160). ELA was a credit line, requested by each
Greek bank, renewed frequently, and funded by the BOG. ELA was governed by Eurosystem
rules, but the BOG bore all risks. Other eurozone countries had used ELA before, but the
Greek case was the first application to an entire financial system. The Greek case was also
the longest use of ELA, spanning three years in its first activation and four years in its second
activation. The ECB’s allowance for prolonged support aimed to avoid fire sales that may
have occurred had ELA ended earlier.
Figure 2: Ten-year Government Bond Yield Spreads over German Bonds, Monthly Data

Source: OECD 2007–2021.
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2. Legal Authority (A): Article 14.4 of the Statute of the European System of Central
Banks (ESCB) allowed the Bank of Greece to implement ELA, subject to Governing
Council review.
The 1992 Treaty on European Union included several annexes related to the functioning of
the Union. Member States that also adopted the euro as their official currency devolved many
powers of financial regulation to the Eurosystem through these annexes. Some monetary
policy powers were also explicitly delegated to the ECB. But the annex—known as the Statute
of the ESCB—reserved to the national central banks powers not explicitly delegated:
National central banks may perform functions other than those specified in this Statute
unless the Governing Council finds, by a majority of two thirds of the votes cast, that
these interfere with the objectives and tasks of the ESCB. Such functions shall be
performed on the responsibility and liability of national central banks and shall not be
regarded as being part of the functions of the ESCB. (European Union 1992, art. 14.4)
Eurosystem central banks had used this authority to lend, at their own risk, to solvent but
illiquid institutions since at least 2007. Still, the Eurosystem imposed rules on liquidityproviding central banks to ensure that lending did not conflict with monetary policy goals.
By 2011, most of the rules that governed ELA were in place. First, the Governing Council
could veto any ELA larger than EUR 2 billion within two business days after the aid was
provided (ECB 2013). Second, the Eurosystem required borrowing institutions to pay a
penalty rate over the Eurosystem refinancing rate. Third, in the Greek case, the Governing
Council also reviewed the total ceiling of ELA usage biweekly (Andruszkiewicz et al. 2020).
Legal Authority (B): The European Commission approved ELA operations as
permissible state aid to private institutions.
Financial interventions in the EU often collided with European Commission competition
regulations, termed “State aid,” which restrict support from Member States to private
companies. Article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
permitted the Commission to find State aid permissible if it was intended "to remedy a
serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State."
The 2008 Banking Communication published by the Commission defined its jurisdiction and
application of the State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the
context of the GFC and clarified how the Commission would review such matters to
determine if State aid was intended “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a
member State” (European Commission 2008, vol. 270, para. 7). While the communication
mostly aimed at guarantees and restructuring efforts, it also acknowledged that a central
bank may wish to augment such efforts with liquidity support, and it allowed, in certain
“exceptional circumstances, a scheme of liquidity support from public sources (including the
central bank)” (Banking Communication 2008, vol. 270, para. 52). This Communication
further acknowledged that “the drastic repercussions of the potential failure of a
systemically relevant financial institution” might require interventions that “extend beyond
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the stabilization of individual financial institutions and include general schemes” (Banking
Communication 2008, vol. 270, para. 4).
Funding provided by a central bank to a financial institution did not constitute State aid if
four conditions were met:
(a) the financial institution was solvent at the moment of the liquidity provision;
(b) the facility was fully secured by collateral to which appropriate haircuts are applied,
in function of its quality and market value;
(c) the central bank charged a penal interest rate to the beneficiary;
(d) the measure was taken at the central bank's own initiative, and in particular was not
backed by any counter-guarantee of the State (European Commission 2008, vol. 270,
para. 51).
Greece’s ELA program satisfied the first three conditions, which defined classical lender-oflast-resort activities (Domanski, Moessner, and Nelson 2014; European Commission 2014).
But the Commission ruled that the ELA constituted State aid since bank borrowing under the
ELA was guaranteed by the Greek government (European Commission 2014).
The Commission then subjected the Greek ELA to the required compatibility standards —
the appropriateness, necessity, and proportionality tests — which the 2008 Banking
Communication outlines as general principles for all programs hoping to comply with State
aid rules. To be appropriate, a State aid program must have been “well-targeted in order to
[remedy] a serious disturbance in the economy” (European Commission 2008, vol. 270, para.
15). State aid documents for the case of support provided to TT Bank—a postal savings
bank—demonstrate the Commission’s general stance toward Greek ELA: The Commission
ruled that “because the Greek banks were shut out from wholesale markets and became
entirely dependent on central bank funding . . . and since [TT] Bank could not borrow a
sufficient amount” from regular refinancing operations, the ELA was appropriate to quell the
“serious disturbance” that may have occurred had the recipient defaulted on its debt
(European Commission 2014).
The Commission then addressed the necessity test, which asked whether the scale of ELA
was enough to achieve its desired effect—rescuing TT Bank from its liquidity crisis—and the
proportionality test, which asked if the scale of ELA went beyond what was required
(European Commission 2008, vol. 270, para. 15). The Commission decided that the ELA’s
premium over Eurosystem refinancing facilities, coupled with close monitoring by the ECB,
“entails a relatively high cost of funding for the Bank, [so that] the Bank has a sufficient
incentive to avoid relying on that source of funding for developing its activities” (European
Commission 2014). As a result, the Commission found that the ELA was “limited to the
minimum amount necessary” (European Commission 2014). The Commission then
determined that the ELA support was proportional, largely owing to the close scrutiny of its
use and regular verification by the BOG and ECB so “that its use [was] limited to the minimum
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[which] also ensure[d] that this liquidity . . . d[id] not lead to undue distortion of competition”
(European Commission 2014).
The Commission also cited Greece’s commitment to implementing “a number of measures
aiming at reducing negative spill-over effects” (European Commission 2014). By this
reasoning, the Commission found that ELA complied with the 2008 Banking Communication
(and the later 2011 Prolongation Communication and the 2013 Banking Communication).
Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2012, art. 107[3][b]), the
Commission considered each bank that received ELA as a separate case subject to review
under the Banking Communication, but it applied the same framework in each case, and in
the eurozone generally (Mourmouras 2017). However, the Commission did not suggest
thresholds for which the amount of ELA would have distorted competition or been more
than the minimum necessary. These counterfactual scenarios cannot be explored since the
Commission permitted State aid for the entire Greek banking system, which the Commission
believed faced a systemic threat (Pantelias 2021c, 23:40-23:50).
Legal Authority (C): The Commission found the state guarantee backing ELA to be
legally sufficient.
The Greek government guaranteed the total amount of ELA—rather than support to any
particular recipient—through its Credit Guarantee Scheme (European Commission 2014;
Andruszkiewicz et al. 2020; Thompson 2021). The Credit Guarantee Scheme allowed banks
to access counterparties that would otherwise not lend to them (European Commission and
Vestager 2015). These counterparties included the BOG, which wanted the Credit Guarantee
Scheme to cover ELA so that the BOG could comply with its risk framework (Pantelias 2021b,
14:21-15:00). To satisfy the conditions for a state-backed scheme, banks must have paid a
guarantee fee higher than the rate5 set in the 2011 Prolongation Communication (European
Commission 2011; 2014). The guarantee fee was added to the 100-150 bps premium
charged over the ECB’s main refinancing rate but the exact figure is not known (European
Commission 2014). Since Greek ELA exceeded this rate, the Commission found the guarantee
acceptable.
The guarantee of Greek ELA was subject to further EU conditions to comply with the ECB’s
prohibition on monetary financing. Specifically, there must have been “no doubts as to the
legal validity and enforceability of the State guarantee” or to “the economic adequacy of the
State guarantee” (ECB 2012). This framework, cited regularly by Eurosystem officials, was
originally articulated in a review of an Italian lira banknote exchange program (Mourmouras
2017; Magnus and Xirou 2017). The ECB meant for these conditions to ensure central-bank
independence (ECB 2012).

That rate was 40 basis points plus “a risk-based fee equal to the product of 40 basis points and a risk metric
composed of: (i) one half of the ratio of the beneficiary's median five-year senior CDS spread over the three
years ending one month before the date of issue of the guaranteed bond to the median level of the iTraxx Europe
Senior Financials five-year index over the same three-year period; plus (ii) one half of the ratio of the median
five-year senior CDS spread of all Member States to the median five-year senior CDS spread of the Member
State granting the guarantee over the same three-year period” (European Commission 2011).
5
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3. Part of a Package: ELA interacted with other crisis-fighting measures but was not
conceived alongside other programs.
The BOG did not introduce ELA as part of a package with other measures. Rather, the BOG
introduced ELA after Greek banks had lost access to Eurosystem financing through LTROs
and MROs. The ECB carved out more authority and flexibility for ELA than open market
operations provided (Pantelias 2021b, 55:16-55:53; Trichet 2010; see Runkel 2022).
4. Management: The Bank of Greece managed ELA under Governing Council
supervision.
The Statute of the ESCB (1992, art. 14.4) gave the Governing Council the right to prohibit ELA
if it interfered with the “objectives and tasks of the [Eurosystem].” In practice, this meant
that the Governing Council voted on an ELA request if it exceeded EUR 2 billion (ECB 2013).
The Governing Council regularly met biweekly, though there was a process to handle urgent
matters (Pantelias 2022).
The BOG reviewed the size of ELA “each week (and more frequently if necessary)” (Pantelias
2022). The BOG was responsible for evaluating collateral to determine the maximum
liquidity each bank could request.
5. Administration: ELA offered an open credit line of euros to eligible banks.
When a bank wanted ELA, it applied to the BOG describing its expected inflows and outflows
for the next few weeks (Pantelias 2021c, 26:18-26:35). The Division of Supervision at the
BOG then reviewed the applicant for solvency, the quality of its collateral, and, with the ECB,
to ensure that banks would receive no more than their need (Pantelias 2021c, 4:30-5:45;
2022). Banks filed these requests to start ELA and whenever they wanted to raise or lower
their level of support (Pantelias 2022).
ELA was monitored daily, weekly, and biweekly to accomplish different objectives. BOG
officials required daily reports from banks to monitor their liquidity conditions. This
informed the BOG’s weekly review of the ELA level. Based on this review and the reports, the
BOG submitted an “ELA note” every two weeks to the ECB Governing Council describing,
bank by bank, the country’s ELA needs.
This note contained nine pieces of information:
(e) the counterparty to which the ELA had been/would be provided;
(f) the value and maturity date of the ELA that had been/would be provided;
(g) the volume of the ELA that had been/would be provided;
(h) the currency in which the ELA had been/would be provided;
(i) the collateral/guarantees against which the ELA had been/would be provided,
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including the valuation of, and any haircuts applied to, the collateral provided and,
where applicable, details on the guarantee provided;
(j) the interest rate to be paid by the counterparty on the ELA that had been/would be
provided;
(k) the specific reason(s) for the ELA that had been/would be provided (e.g., margin
calls, deposit outflows);
(l) the prudential supervisor’s assessment, over the short and medium term, of the
liquidity position and solvency of the institution receiving the ELA, including the
criteria used to come to a positive conclusion with respect to solvency; and
(m) where relevant, an assessment of the cross-border dimensions and/or the potential
systemic implications of the situation that had made/was making the extension of
ELA necessary. (ECB 2013)
The BOG received this information during daily calls with bank managers. Banks disclosed
their liquidity status and any significant near-term liabilities. Through these calls, the BOG
exercised its informational advantage over the ECB. It had officials appointed to supervise
each bank and was much closer to those banks than were ECB officials (Pantelias 2021b).
The BOG also used these calls to communicate policies to banks. For instance, the BOG
wanted to avoid any public impression that banks were running low on liquidity. Their policy
was to satisfy any request for cash on the same business day. And the phone calls let them
monitor which banks needed banknotes soon. In the event that some did, commercial
airplanes flew overnight from Frankfurt to Athens carrying banknotes in anticipation of the
next business day (Pantelias 2021b, 43:32-45:34). However, ELA usually took the form of
credit in banks’ reserve accounts. ECB guidelines stated that ELA could be “central bank
money and/or any other assistance that may lead to an increase in central bank money” (ECB
2013).
6. Eligible Participants: All solvent and viable Greek banks were eligible for ELA and
participated.
All solvent banks were eligible to receive ELA. To assess solvency, the BOG’s Division of
Supervision subjected banks to an asset quality review and stress test. These evaluated bank
capital conditions under static and dynamic conditions looking forward more than two years
(Pantelias 2021c, 7:17-7:56). This condition was required by the ECB (2013). The viability
condition was required by the European Commission, which would not grant aid to
institutions that would still be at risk of failure after State aid (Pantelias 2021c, 16:27-16:35;
European Commission 2013).
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The ECB considered credit institutions solvent if their relevant capital ratios complied with
its general guidelines6 or if they held “a credible prospect of recapitalization […] within 24
weeks” of the quarter that showed insufficient capital. In the case of Greek banks,
determining solvency “was a huge project” (ECB 2017; Pantelias 2021c, 6:37). The financial
position of Greek banks depended on the possibility of further assistance by the state, which
in turn depended on the solvency and viability assessments (Magnus and Xirou 2017).
Generally, lender-of-last-resort programs suffer from difficulties distinguishing between
illiquidity and insolvency, and by the time a thorough audit is complete, institutions that
were solvent before the audit may no longer be (Domanski, Moessner, and Nelson 2014). In
practice, though “everybody tried to avoid [applying for ELA], within a few weeks” of ELA
starting, “all [eligible] Greek banks decided to participate . . . they had no other choice”
(Pantelias 2021b, 18:08-18:25).
However, only banks majority-owned by Greek entities could receive ELA from the BOG.
Banks owned by foreign entities could receive support from their parent bank, or ultimately
via ELA from their parent’s central bank (Mourmouras 2017). For example, during the crisis,
a distressed Portuguese bank operating in Greece was referred to Banco de Portugal and was
not supported by the BOG; both major Cypriot banks had access to ELA via the Central Bank
of Cyprus (Pantelias 2021b, 4:32-5:22).
7. Funding Source: The BOG funded ELA on its balance sheet and credit was
guaranteed by the Greek government.
Although ELA took the form of a Eurosystem liability, the BOG alone bore responsibility for
any defaults or other losses (ECB 2013).
The BOG requested that the Greek government guarantee the ELA of all participating banks
through its existing Credit Guarantee Scheme (Pantelias 2021b, 14:21-15:30, 47:50-49:10).
The BOG did this to minimize its exposure to credit risk. As a result, the Greek government
bore the credit risk. Banks participating in ELA were required to pay the government a
guarantee fee (European Commission 2014; see Thompson 2021 for a review of the
program).
8. Program Size: The size of ELA was subject to a ceiling set by the ECB and reviewed
every week.
The size of ELA was subject to a ceiling that the ECB Governing Council set and reviewed
weekly (Andruszkiewicz et al. 2020). The ECB Governing Council approved EUR 50 billion
initially for the Greek ELA. This number grew quickly as the support requested by each bank
in ELA notes grew. Outstanding ELA in Greece peaked at EUR 124 billion in May 2012, and
then again at EUR 87 billion in June 2015, during the second activation of ELA (Runkel 2021).
In June 2015, the ECB raised the Greek ELA limit to EUR 88.9 billion but refused to raise it
further (Pantelias 2021c, 23:33-23:45; Wyplosz 2015; Andruszkiewicz et al. 2020). The ELA
ceilings that the Governing Council set were not made public until September 17, 2015—
In 2017, these ratios were: 4.5% for Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1); 6% for Tier 1; and 8% for Total Capital
(ECB 2017).
6
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after ELA usage and the ceiling had declined—when the ceiling stood at EUR 88.9 billion
(BOG 2015).
9. Individual Participation Limits: The BOG limited borrowing only by the quality
and amount of a bank’s collateral.
The BOG limited borrowing only by the quality and amount of each bank’s collateral,
although it could have denied funds based on other factors (Pantelias 2021b, 21:10-22:30).
As discussed in Key Design Decision Error! Reference source not found., the Governing
Council did not scrutinize the ELA positions of individual banks, but rather of the system at
large. The June 2015 Governing Council decision not to raise the ELA ceiling affected
individual bank borrowing, but not because of the applications of any one bank (Pantelias
2021c, 23:33-23:50).
10. Rate Charged: ECB guidelines required banks to pay 100-150 bps above the main
refinancing rate.
ECB guidelines reflect that ELA is a lender-of-last-resort facility (Magnus and Xirou 2017).
Following Bagehot’s dictum, Greek ELA required borrowers to pay a premium rate,
disincentivizing use (ECB 2017). This premium was between 100 bps and 150 bps over the
Eurosystem’s main refinancing rate (Suoninen and Jones 2013; Mourmouras 2017;
Andruszkiewicz et al. 2020). In total, borrowers paid an estimated EUR 4.5 billion in premia:
EUR 2 billion between 2011 and 2014; and EUR 2.5 billion between 2015 and 2019
(Andruszkiewicz et al. 2020). These costs are depicted in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Estimated Costs of ELA to Banks 2010-2019, in EUR billions

Source: Andruszkiewicz et al. 2020.

11. Eligible Collateral: The BOG accepted Greek government bonds, as well as any
collateral that the ECB accepted for open market operations.
Part of the BOG’s stated purpose in administering ELA was to counter the “decrease in the
value of eligible collateral [held by Greek banks] for monetary policy operations” (Bank of
Greece 2014, 160). Specifically, the BOG accepted Greek sovereign debt, regardless of its
credit rating, as collateral under the ELA. This was important because Greek debt was, at
times, not eligible for Eurosystem refinancing operations. Four separate waivers allowed
Greek banks to use Greek sovereign debt as collateral in Eurosystem refinancing operations
(see Figure 4). When the ECB revoked those waivers on February 27, 2012; July 18, 2012;
and February 11, 2015, ELA draws soared, as shown in Figure 1. In addition, the BOG
accepted some privately issued securities and performing loans (Pantelias 2021c, 3:354:00). “As far as it is known, the majority of collateral used in ELA as collateral is Government
guarantees or bonds that have ratings lower than those accepted for the ECB’s standard
monetary policy operations” (Mourmouras 2017).
At the beginning of ELA, the BOG told banks to post all their eligible collateral to the BOG’s
settlement system. In doing so, the BOG could provide additional ELA quickly, as it had
already reviewed collateral. There was little opportunity cost in posting this collateral since
international banks had refused lending to Greek banks, leaving Greek banks with no other
options (Pantelias 2021b, 21:40-21:50). The BOG’s decision to accept Greek debt prevented
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such assets from sitting idle on balance sheets and allowed banks to receive funding when
no other counterparties were interested.
Figure 4: Waivers Allowing Greek Debt as Collateral in Eurosystem Refinancing
Operations
Date enacted
January 1, 2011

Date revoked
February 27, 2012

March 5, 2012

July 18, 2012

December 21, 2012

February 11, 2015

June 22, 2016

August 10, 2018

Reason for revocation
Government launched debt exchange program that
decreased the quality of Greek bonds
Bond-purchase program that insured the value of
Greek bonds ended
SYRIZA party wins elections and says it will not
comply with Economic Adjustment Programme
Economic Adjustment Programme ends

Source: ECB/2012/2 2012; ECB/2012/14 2012; ECB/2015/6 2015; ECB/2018/21 2018.

In addition to accepting Greek debt under the ELA, the BOG also accepted other collateral
that would have been accepted by the ECB: marketable debt instruments rated at least A-,
and two standard non-marketable assets — bank loans and retail mortgage-backed debt
(RMBD; ECB 2006). Only collateral denominated in euros was eligible.
The BOG applied haircuts to all collateral. Haircuts were harmonized with the ECB’s
schedule, available in the Appendix, with the exception of Greek debt. Figure 5 shows the
haircuts that the BOG applied to Greek debt. The BOG changed its schedule of haircuts on
Greek debt posted against monetary policy operations in December 2014 and July 2015. The
schedules used before December 2014, between December 2014 and July 2015, and after
July 2015 are shown respectively as Schedule A, B, and C in Figure 5. Only Schedules A and C
were used during a period that ELA was active. In the first period (Schedule A), the BOG
applied haircuts between 15% and 71% on Greek sovereign debt and between 23% and 81%
on guaranteed private debt, depending on remaining maturity and whether the bonds paid
coupons. In the third period (Schedule C), the BOG applied a fixed 45% haircut on all Greek
debt.
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Figure 5: Haircuts on Greek Debt throughout the Eurozone Crisis

Source: Mourmouras 2017.

12. Loan Duration: Maturities varied bank by bank and were revised as banks
requested new limits.
Documents did not reveal the maturities of ELA, but BOG officials said that ELA was generally
short-term and was revised when a bank requested a new limit of support.
13. Other Conditions: ELA did not impose other conditions on participants.
Documents surveyed do not indicate other conditions that were required under ELA.
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14. Impact on Monetary Policy Transmission: The Commission limited ELA to only the
amount necessary to keep banks in operation.
Under the ECB’s ELA policy, ELA must not have interfered with the implementation of the
Eurosystem’s monetary policy (ECB 2013). To ensure this, the ECB’s Governing Council
reviewed the Greek ELA activity every two weeks (Andruszkiewicz et al. 2020). In its note
approving the Greek ELA, the European Commission (2014) found that its rules, along with
ECB and BOG management, “limited [ELA] to the minimum necessary” to stabilize a
participating bank, and accordingly, the system. Through its monitoring, the ECB Governing
Council attempted to balance the amount of ELA with the amount of liquidity in the Greek
banking system for the permissible financial stability purposes. Pantelias (2021b, 12:53)
asserted that ELA “[could] not be used for credit expansion, period.”
15. Other Options: ELA substituted for longer-term refinancing operations.
ELA played a lender-of-last-resort role in the Eurosystem (Mourmouras 2017). Before
drawing on ELA, Greek participants used MROs and LTROs to secure credit. Between
September 2010 and the start of ELA in August 2011, Greek banks were borrowing more
than 20% of the Eurosystem’s outstanding MRO liquidity and 20% of the outstanding LTRO
liquidity, as shown in Figure 6 (Runkel 2021; ECB 2021). Pantelias (2021b, 55:16-55:53)
noted that the ECB “did everything in [its] power to help” the Greek banks using
“alternatives” to open market operations. Greek banks reverted to ELA after they lost access
to LTROs and exhausted main refinancing operations (MROs).
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Figure 6: Greek Usage of Eurosystem Open Market Operations

Source: ECB 2021; Runkel 2021.

16. Similar Programs in Other Countries: Greece’s, Ireland’s, and Portugal’s programs
were the first broad uses of ELA; seven other eurozone members supported
multiple institutions in the years that followed.
Before 2009, ELA had been used only to administer support to one or two institutions at a
time (Mourmouras 2017). The 2008 Banking Communication (2008, vol. 270, para. 2)
recognized that the scale and nature of the GFC affected solvent and insolvent institutions
alike. And several sources noted that distinguishing between the two can be difficult and
risky (Domanski, Moessner, and Nelson 2014; Mourmouras 2017). These factors resulted in
the ECB broadening “the scope of assistance from individual [banks] to the entire banking
system” (Mourmouras 2017).
As one of the first broad-based uses of ELA, the Greek experience shaped the rules of later
programs and caused the ECB to refine and standardize its rules. For instance, ELA
procedures applicable to the entire eurozone were published during its administration (ECB
2013; ECB 2017). Figure 7 describes some experiences of ELA during the crisis.
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A Bank of Greece working paper gives a fuller treatment. Gibson et al. (2020) surveyed 10
banks in Austria, 10 in Belgium, four in Cyprus, 11 in France, nine in Germany, nine in Ireland,
12 in Italy, nine in the Netherlands, 12 in Portugal, and 14 in Spain. All received liquidity
support during the GFC.
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Figure 7: ELA Usage in the Eurozone, 2007–2017

Source: Mourmouras 2017.
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17. Communication: The BOG and ECB slowly abandoned constructive ambiguity and
became more transparent.
Neither BOG nor the ECB communicated with the public on a regular basis about ELA. This
approach typified constructive ambiguity, in which a central bank deliberately does not
disclose information about how decisions are made regarding lender-of-last-resort
activities. Proponents of this approach, widely followed before the GFC, held “that ex ante
ambiguity about the provision of liquidity support c[ould] effectively contain moral hazard”
(Domanski, Moessner, and Nelson 2014). If a bank did not know which criteria a central bank
would use when deciding whether to intervene, then that bank would make sure that its
activities appeared prudent based on any criteria a central bank could use (Magnus and
Xirou 2017). Eurozone central banks cited constructive ambiguity in their policies, where
such policies existed:
By end-2006, about half of the central banks of the G10 advanced economies had
publicly released statements on their ELA policies. Generally, these statements set out
broad guidelines or principles for ELA. Many central banks, particularly in the euro area,
were deliberately vague about their ELA policies, emphasising the importance of
constructive ambiguity. (Domanski, Moessner, and Nelson 2014)
But constructive ambiguity became impossible when the system became too fragile
(Domanski, Moessner, and Nelson (2014). Eurozone central banks, led by the ECB, began to
move past constructive ambiguity during the GFC. In 2013, the ECB released standard
procedures for ELA, formalizing these protocols in a 2017 agreement with national central
banks (ECB 2013; ECB 2017). The BOG added to this movement by regularly disclosing its
ELA ceiling starting in 2015, while other central banks remained quiet about their ELA
activities (Magnus and Xirou 2017).
18. Disclosure: The BOG reported aggregate ELA levels mixed with other assets.
Eurozone national central banks were required to publish monthly financial statements, but
ELA did not carry its own disclosure requirements. The BOG reported total ELA lending on a
comingled basis with other lending to eurozone credit institutions.7 Banks receiving ELA also
did not have to disclose their ELA borrowings. State aid documents revealed some details of
banks’ positions, but the disclosures were not standardized and State aid procedures did not
impose rules about ELA disclosure. The EU’s regulatory structure supported this lack of
disclosure to the point of waiving regulatory requirements “to ensure that . . . the amount of
liquidity assistance given by central banks cannot be detected” (European Banking Authority
2014).

Until April 2012, these figures appeared either under line 10 of its monthly financial statements for Sundry
assets, after which they appeared under line 6 for Other lending to euro area credit institutions. BOG officials
stated that the only other expenses mixed in with line 6 were “insignificant” (BOG Financial Accounts Team
2021; it did not comment on line 10).
7
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Additionally, State aid documents redact the actual premia charged by the BOG to
participants.
19. Stigma Strategy: The BOG did not use a strategy to manage ELA stigma.
Banks needed ELA regardless of the reputational risks, according to Spiros Pantelias, then
head of financial stability at BOG. ELA “may have been viewed negatively by market
participants but banks had no other alternative at that time” (Pantelias 2021a). In other
words, the need for cash surmounted the price of stigma.
20. Exit Strategy: ELA ended as Greek banks were restructured and regained access to
alternative sources of lending.
The premium rate and short loan duration left healthy banks with better options than ELA,
disincentivizing its long-term usage. This was important because even though ELA lasted
several years, by the ECB’s rules it must be temporary and last no longer than was needed.
The weekly ELA notes and biweekly ECB reviews allowed banks to repay and exit ELA when
they found financing alternative forms of financing (Pantelias 2021c, 19:42-21:08).
Greek banks found alternative financing gradually as deposits returned slowly and privatesector lending limits increased. In 2013, Greek banks outperformed their expectations and
ELA saw a sharp drop-off (Pantelias 2021c, 21:18). ELA usage fell also as private
counterparties saw the support given by the government and BOG, as shown in Figure 8
(Pantelias 2021b, 26:48-27:52). Banks’ health improved after a successful recapitalization
program, a consolidation of banks, and other programs .
By May 2014, no Greek banks were drawing on ELA (Mourmouras 2017). But the BOG saw
the impending election of the SYRIZA party, which had campaigned on anti-austerity
measures and committed itself to avoiding negotiations with the Troika, as a source of
financial instability and “nobody was surprised when, for a significant amount of time, we
had continuous deposit outflows” (Pantelias 2021a, 30:27-30:50). ELA usage during the
second phase tapered much more gradually than the first but followed the same causes. In
June 2016, the ECB reinstated Greek bonds as eligible collateral (ECB/2016/18 2016). Still,
LTRO usage remained low compared to the first phase of ELA, possibly suggesting that banks
could again access the private interbank market (see Figure 1). Support tapered even more
after the ECB declared in 2018 that Greece was no longer subject to an EAP, and finally ended
in August 2019 (ECB/2018/21 2018).
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Figure 8: Private-Sector Deposits in Greek Banks, EUR millions

Source: Andruszkiewicz et al. 2020.
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Appendix
Figure 9: ECB Liquidity Categories and Haircut Schedule
ECB Liquidity Categories
Category I
Central
government
debt
instruments
Debt
instruments
issued by
national central
banks*

Category II
Category III
Local and regional Traditional covered
government debt bank bonds
instruments

Category IV
Credit institution debt
instruments
(unsecured)

Jumbo covered
bank bonds†

Debt instruments
issued by financial
corporations other
than credit
institutions
(unsecured)

Debt instruments
issued by nonfinancial
corporations and
other issuers‡

Category V
Assetbacked
securities

Agency debt
Other covered bank
instruments‡
bonds§
Supranational
debt instruments
* Debt certificates issued by the ECB and debt instruments issued by the national central banks prior to the
adoption of the euro in their respective Member State are included in liquidity category I.
† Only instruments with an issuing volume of at least EUR 1 billion, for which at least three market-makers
provide regular bid and ask quotes, fall into the asset class of jumbo covered bank bonds.
‡ Only marketable assets issued by issuers that have been classified as agencies by the ECB are included in
liquidity category II. Marketable assets issued by other agencies are included in liquidity category III or IV,
depending on the issuer and asset type.
§ Non-UCITS-compliant covered bank bonds, including both structured covered bank bonds and multi-issuer
covered bank bonds are included in liquidity category III.
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ECB haircut schedule
Credit Residual Liquidity categories
quality maturity Category I
Category II*
Category III* Category IV*
Category
(years) fixed zero
V*
fixed zero
fixed zero
fixed zero
coupon coupon coupon coupon coupon coupon coupon coupon
Steps 1 0-1
0.5
0.5
1.0
1.0
1.5
1.5
6.5
6.5
16
and 2 1-3
1.5
1.5
2.5
2.5
3.0
3.0
8.5
9.0
(AAA to 3-5
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
5.0
5.5
11.0
11.5
A-)
5-7
3.0
3.5
4.5
5.0
6.5
7.5
12.5
13.5
7-10
4.0
4.5
5.5
6.5
8.5
9.5
14.0
15.5
> 10
5.5
8.5
7.5
12.0
11.0
16.5
17.0
22.5
Step 3 0-1
5.5
5.5
6.0
6.0
8.0
8.0
15.0
15.0
Not
(BBB + 1-3
eligible
6.5
6.5
10.5
11.5
18.0
19.5
27.5
29.5
to BBB- 3-5
7.5
8.0
15.5
17.0
25.5
28.0
36.5
39.5
)**
5-7
8.0
8.5
18.0
20.5
28.0
31.5
38.5
43.0
7-10
9.0
9.5
19.5
22.5
29.0
33.5
39.0
44.5
> 10
10.5
13.5
20.0
29.0
29.5
38.0
39.5
46.0
* Individual asset-backed securities, covered bank bonds (jumbo covered bank bonds, traditional covered bank
bonds and other covered bank bonds) and uncovered bank bonds that are theoretically valued in accordance
with Section 6.5 are subject to an additional valuation haircut. This haircut is directly applied at the level of the
theoretical valuation of the individual debt instrument in the form of a valuation markdown of 5 %.
Source: ECB 2011.
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